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PANEL DISCUSSION
RUTI TEITEL: As the program indicates, the next panel addresses the
issues of punishment, amnesties and pardons. The last ten years have
witnessed in Latin America and other regions of the world, transitions
from military regimes to democratically elected regimes. This shift has
brought a call for a response by the legal systems to the gross abuses of
prior military dictatorships and to the massive violations of basic human
rights, including disappearances and torture.' This response took the
form of trials of military officers in Argentina and other places.2 Amid
this call for trials and justice are now heard arguments announcing the
need for amnesty, non-punishment and national healing.
Instead of each panelist talking about their country's experiences in
general, the following questions will be discussed: What did people seek
to achieve in the countries where there were trials? What did the trials
accomplish? What are the differences between these concepts? What does
it mean not to punish? What are the mechanisms other than legal
responses? What are the non-national legal responses?
I. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR STATE-SPONSORED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
I would like to start by raising the issue of trials. Earlier today, we
heard from our distinguished guests about the need for legal responses, for
trials and for an International War Crimes Court. They raised the
following question: what is the purpose of prosecuting prior military
officers? Since Argentina is the leading example of trial use in Latin
America, I would like to address this question to the representatives and
commentators of the Argentine system first.
Luis (Ocampo), since you just spoke about trials, can you give us
some sense of what was and was not achieved by trials and your general
comments?
LUIS MORENO OCAMPO: The trials signify a legal response to the
illegality. This is especially impressive for the Argentine people because
those accused were former presidents, generals and admirals who,
generally speaking, are above the law in Argentina. The trials have
another dimension; that is, in a country with a history of military coups,
the trials were a bridge between dictatorship and a working democracy.
It is proof that one can replace the arbitrariness and terror of the
totalitarian regime with the justice of the democratic system.
1. See L. WECHSLER, A MIRACLE, A UNIVERSE 3-4 (1990).
2. Id. at 165-67; D. HODGES, ARGENTINA: 1943-1987, at 239 (1986).
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TEITEL: I want to follow up with Roberto (Garraton Merino) and ask
him about the many cases that we do not know about that were initiated
by civilians. What about the success or possibilities of those cases
initiated by private parties in Chile against the military? What does the
future look like in Chile for legal responses to those crimes?
ROBERTO GARRA TON MERINO (TRANSLATION): I will have to give
some information concerning the legal realities in Chile at the present
time. In Chile, since the beginning of the military dictatorship, trials were
carried out against those people who opposed the regime. These trials
practically accounted for all crimes committed in Chile. Since the system
of violation of human rights presupposes impunity, those who actually
commit the crimes suppose that they will never be called to account for
them. In fact, the question is not one of crimes committed but, rather,
one of what positive contribution must be made for the welfare of the
country. Despite the fact that much evidence has been collected, trials
have not yielded great or even good results. Unfortunately, the Chilean
Supreme Court and the military tribunals do not care about the quality of
the evidence when they try those who opposed the regime. But when it
comes to trying the military, they become very precise and they demand
exact evidence.
In the murder of a friend and companion of mine, it was known
before his body was found that he was detained with other people in an
unknown location. Some of the other prisoners stated that they were held
captive and blindfolded. In addition, they testified that they were tied to
a column, which they claimed was two inches in diameter. The court,
however, found that the testimony was invalid because the column was not
two inches in diameter but rather only an inch and a half. This is why we
have been unable to achieve any positive results. But there is another
problem-a problem of a legal nature.
In 1978, the dictatorship adopted an amnesty law that covered all
crimes. 3 However, they insisted on one condition: the law would apply
solely to those crimes whose perpetrators were unknown, that is, the
crimes they committed for which the dictatorship was responsible. 4 This
law is in force and is applicable to any incident that occurred before
1978.' For those incidents occurring after the enactment of the amnesty
law, there is no amnesty.' The program, as it was put together during
the campaign of the democratic government, proposed that the democratic
3. Rosenberg, Fall of the Patriarch, NEW REPUBUC, Dec. 18, 1989, at 20.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Politzer, Chile Chooses a President, NATION, Dec. 25, 1989, at 781.
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government, through the Congress, would abolish the amnesty law. Those
of us who put forth that proposition expected to win a majority in both
houses of the Congress. Our expectations were fulfilled in that in the
Senate, we managed to elect twenty-two senators while the dictatorship
was able to elect sixteen. 7 Unfortunately, the constitution establishes that
the president of the nation's previous administration, in other words
Pinochet, could name nine additional senators.8 This meant that our
majority, twenty-two to sixteen, was converted into a minority of twenty-
five to twenty-two. This also meant that what was offered to the people
could not be carried out unless the democratic government would violate
the law and go against the constitution. The only path remaining to
choose was to establish the truth. For acts committed before 1978, a
commission will be created similar to the Sabato Commission in Argenti-
na, which will seek to clear up the facts. For those acts occurring after
1978, the trials, as they have been carried out thus far, will continue. The
government's duty is to put the police to work for the truth and to compel
the courts to do justice. But I would like to be frank and acknowledge
that the police are the same police that were there before. Consequently,
their cooperation is not guaranteed.
I would like to convey one final idea, that is, the victims of the
violations of human rights have understood the difficulties that we face
because we lack a majority in the Senate. They are hurt, not by a
government that cannot do what is forbidden by the law, but rather, by the
lack of a significant majority of people who will assume to take on the
pain and suffering of the victims of human rights abuses.
FELIPE MICHELINI: The criminal trials in Uruguay started just before
the national elections of 1984.' However, when the new democratic
authorities started working in parliament under the new government, there
were only 100 criminal claims still outstanding. This was very few given
the number of human rights violations that occurred in Uruguay following
the 1973 military coup d'etat. There are many reasons why the number
is so small, but that is not the point. The point is that there were very
few criminal claims at that time. The only claims asserted were those
against well known torturers-whose identity and crimes were known by
all of society.
The terms of the Comision Nationale stated that there was national
agreement on the decision to bring official claims before the judicial
7. Constable, Aluyn's Triumph in Chile Offset by Rightist Gains, Boston Globe, Dec.
16, 1989, at 2, col. 1.
8. See id.; E. BIZZARO, HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF CHILE 133 (2d ed. 1987).
9. L. WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 167.
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branch.'0 Since the beginning of these trials, there has been a judicial
struggle between the ordinary court and the military court over who had
the right to judge these crimes. It took six months for these trials to go
to the criminal courts, to call the criminals and to call those that were
accused of these crimes. Two and a half years ago, the trial came to the
Supreme Court." The Supreme Court decided that, in fact, it was the
civil court that had the right to judge these crimes. 12 In any event, the
trials stopped working in December 1986.
In July 1986, six months after the law of impunity was put into effect,
the amnesty law was passed. The law was passed to relieve the obligation
of one of the torturers to present himself before the court. It was clear
that the goal of the law was to stop any kind of investigation and
punishment for these crimes.
TEITEL: I would like to turn to Ken Anderson and ask about Guatemala.
Has there been any case of an official brought to trial for human rights
violations and are there any other sorts of cases either initiated by the state
or civil parties? Are there civil actions in Guatemala?
KENNETH ANDERSON: I am afraid that Guatemala is going to be, in
many respects, the nightmare alternative to what is being discussed here.
The Guatemalan justice system has had no experience in dealing with
human rights cases. I suppose that the fundamental reason for this is that
the military has never relinquished its power even though it has been
subject to all the elements of democracy. Therefore, all these other
questions about alternative forms of punishment are, to a large extent,
rendered moot.
I think this can be seen in the fact that there simply have been no
prosecutions for human rights offenses. There have been occasional
hearings, albeit for other kinds of matters and not for human rights
violations per se. Thereis a very good reason for the lack of human
rights trials-the people running the country, who sit directly behind the
civilians, are the military. They do not believe that they have to go
through any legal forms; they have granted themselves amnesties.
This lack of involvement with human rights does not have to be the
outcome anywhere in Latin America. I do not think that Guatemala
should be a disheartening example; certainly, it is something that ought to
give all of us great pause when we look around and see the efforts to
conform to democratic procedures. We ought to skeptically consider the
belief that it is better to hold elections and set up democratic procedures
10. But see id.
11. Id. at 167, 214.
12. Id. at 214.
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when no compelling reason exists for the military to retire itself. It may
turn out that rather than sketching the outlines of democracy and filing in
the content later, that in fact we will sketch out the outlines of democracy
and leave the military exactly where it is-where it will serve no just
purpose whatsoever.
The Guatemalan justice system simply has no weight with respect to
human rights. It does not abuse human rights; it does not enforce human
rights; it has nothing to do with human rights. This is a great tragedy, but
I certainly do not blame the judges; would you step into a situation in
which you were asked to enforce tights that never existed? Keep in mind,
it may cost you your life. For example, a former university student
disappeared in Guatemala, and shots were fired at the Guatamalan rural
human rights monitor. In addition, the United States recently removed its
ambassador because of Guatemala's numerous human rights violations.
These ongoing human rights violations are all directly related to the fact
that there was never any clean-out of the military. The Guatemalan
situation demonstrates that we should be more cautious before deciding
that it is better to set up a government that is democratic in form but not
in substance.
TEITEL: We now have a flavor of what is going on in the Southern Cone
and in Guatemala. I would like to turn now to Professor Garro and his
expertise with the inter-American system. What is the status of the
obligation to punish any of these countries? Have they agreed to
standards?
ALEJANDRO M. GARRO: Legal accountability for past human rights
offenses is a formidable challenge presented to post-authoritarian societies
seeking to establish, restore or consolidate the rule of law. This subject
has emerged as an important topic in international human rights law,
primarily in response to a series of general amnesties and presidential
pardons granted in the 1980s by Latin American countries, which had the
worst records of human rights abuses in the 1970s. Prominent examples
of amnesties granted in Latin America include: Chile in 1978,13 Brazil
13. Decree-Law No. 2191, D.O., No. 30042, Apr. 19, 1978 (Chile). The Chilean
amnesty law granted amnesty for crimes committed between September 11, 1973, and
March 10, 1978, so long as those persons were not under process or convicted. Id. The
statute also benefitted persons convicted by military courts after September 11, 1973. Id.
For an English translation of this legislation and a description of the scope of this amnesty,
see U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 12) at 63 and Annex XXVIII, U.N. Doc. A/33/331 (1978).
Chilean courts interpreted this statute to bar both investigation and punishment. Id. In a
case involving the disappearance of 10 persons arrested in December 1976 by the security
forces, Appeals Court Judge Carlos Cerda FernAndez indicted a total of 40 persons on
charges of illegal association and kidnapping. Id. Included among the accused were
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in 1979,4 Argentina through a series of statutes and decrees adopted
between December 1986 and December 1990,'" Guatemala in 1986,6
El Salvador in 19877 and Uruguay in 1986.1' Identification of the
members of the Air Force, carabineros, police forces and civilians. Id. In an appeal
brought by four of the accused in September 1986, the Santiago Court of Appeals held that
the amnesty law barred the indictments handed down by Judge Cerda and ordered Judge
Cerda to close the file. Id. On October 6, 1986, the Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
Because Judge Cerda expressed his unwillingness to close the case, the Supreme Court
stripped him of jurisdiction in the case and suspended him from the bench for two months
at half pay. See ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. & OF THE INT'L BAR ASS'N,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE23-28 (1987). In August 1989, the
case returned to Judge Cerda so he could issue the final stay and close it permanently. Id.
He refused, once again, on the ground that the 1978 amnesty law violated Chile's
international obligations. El porqu. Ministro Cerda no dictM el "caiplase" en fallo sobre
10 detenidos-desaparecidos, La Segunda (Santiago), Aug. 2, 1898. The Supreme Court
did not take notice of Cerda's opinion until July 1990 and ordered him to stay the case.
Id. Judge Cerda refused to do so, and the Supreme Court disciplined Judge Cerda once
again in January 1990. Id.
14. Enacted in 1979, the amnesty statute applied to human rights abuses committed by
state officials but excluded about 200 government opponents who had committed violent
political crimes. N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1979, at 21, col. 1.
15. Law No. 23492 of Dec. 24, 1986 [XLVII-A] A.D.L.A. 192-93 (Argen.) ("full
stop" law); Law No. 23521 of June 4, 1987 [XLVII-B] A.D.L.A. 1548 (Argen.) ("due
obedience" law). On June 22, 1987, in a four to one decision, the Argentine Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the "due obedience" law. See [1987-D] L.L. 94. In
October- 1989, President Carlos Menem issued blanket pardons to a group of 39 former
military officers accused of abusing civilians during the military government, which lasted
from 1976 to 1983. Id. He also pardoned 164 officers who allegedly took part in three
armed challenges against former President Raill Alfonsin, three convicted of negligence in
the 1982 Falklands War and dozens of terrorist suspects. Decrees No. 1002, 1003, 1004
& 1005, B.O., Oct. 10, 1989 (Argen.). In December 1990, another presidential decree
covered former presidents Jorge Rafael Videla and Roberto Viola, four other former high-
level officials, who were serving long-term sentences, and Mario Firmenich, a former
guerrilla leader who was serving a 30-year sentence. See AMERICAS WATCH, TRUTH AND
PARTIAL JUSTICE IN ARGENTINA: AN UPDATE 65-70 (1991).
16. Days before leaving office, the military promulgated 08-86, an amnesty for "all
people implicated in political crimes and all related common crimes during the period from
March 23, 1982 to January 14, 1986." See THE ADMINISTRATION OF INJUSTICE, MILITARY
ACCOUNTABILITY IN GUATEMALA 2 (1989) (Washington office in Latin America).
17. A broad amnesty, which was enacted in 1987, immunized Salvadoran government
officials and guerrillas from prosecution for past offenses. The amnesty decree, which
passed by a vote of 60 to 45, encompasses the following crimes: common crimes in which
20 or more persons participated; crimes connected with armed conflict; crimes committed
for political motives; and "crimes against the State," which are described in Articles 373-
80, 400-11 and 151 of the Salvadoran Criminal Code. Decreto No. 805, D.O., No. 199,
Oct. 28, 1987 (El Sal.). The Code includes offenses such as terrorism, subversive
association, conspiracy and the like. Id.
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international legal principles governing this issue has become increasingly
important as challenges to various amnesty laws are being considered by
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States.
Admittedly, the question about what should be done about the killers
and torturers cannot be reduced to an examination of existing international
legal obligations. One must acknowledge at the outset the complex moral
and political dimensions of the problem. Pardoning the unforgivable can
never be justified on moral grounds, and the political wisdom of freeing
the authors of serious human rights violations is highly questionable,
especially when such violations conform to a pattern of systematic state-
sponsored mass murder. Yet the imperatives of "national reconciliation"
and the need to forge constructive civil/military relations have been
invoked by governments as a political justification to waive prosecution of
death-squad killers and sadistic torturers.19
The allegation that national reconciliation requires staying prosecutions
for the previous regime's depredations is highly questionable;' at the
same time, however, it is difficult to measure the actual deterring effects
of prosecutions. The fact that the destabilizing or deterrent effects of
prosecutions are uncertain and closely related to the political circumstances
18. Ley de Caducidad de la Pretensi6n Punitiva del Estado, Law No. 15848 (Law of
Peremption of the State's Right to Punish Certain Crimes), Dec. 22, 1986 (Uru.). The Ley
de Caducidad terminated the State's power to prosecute and punish military and police
personnel responsible for human rights violations during Uruguay's period of military rule
and until March 1, 1985. Id. The statute purposefully omitted any reference to the word
"amnesty" because several draft amnesty laws had already been rejected by the Uruguayan
Parliament, and, according to Uruguayan law, a defeated measure could not be reconsid-
ered in the same parliamentary session. Id.
19. See Letter of President Sanguinetti to Amnesty International, Mar. 31, 1987,
reprinted in AMNESTY INT'L, URUGUAY: LEGISLATION DEALING WITH PAST HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS, app. 2 (Oct. 1987) ("the Uruguayan government has decided to take
measures of magnanimity or clemency utilizing a mechanism provided for in the
Constitution of the Republic. The 12 years of dictatorship have left scars which will need
a long time to heal and it is good to begin to do so. The country needs reconciliation to
face a difficult but promising future .... ).
20. A 1985 special report on amnesties, written by Louis Joinet for the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, noted that "an amnesty covering persons guilty of conduct
involving a serious infringement of human dignity . .. far from encouraging national
reconciliation, would only increase tension .... " See 37 U.N. ESCOR Commission on
Human Rights at 9, para. 35, U.N. Doec. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/15 (1984). With respect to
disappearances, it has been argued that failure to clarify the fate of the victims "keeps deep
resentment and it makes national unity and reconciliation more difficult." See Zalaquett,
Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Governments: Principles
Applicable and Political Constraints, in STATE CRIMES: PUNISHMENT OR PARDON? 36-37
(1989).
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of each democratic transition should not inhibit efforts to identify the
minimum international standards that each country must observe.
It is important to bear in mind that in most post-authoritarian countries
the killers and torturers are still at large, and that its intellectual instigators
still occupy positions of power. It has been argued on this basis that the
promotion of social peace and imperatives of democratic restoration make
it politically tolerable for fragile democracies to strike a pragmatic plea-
bargain between the civilian government and the security forces. I believe
that callous calculations on political expediency and speculation about the
governments political ability to investigate, prosecute and convict former
oppressors obscures the most important values at stake. As soon as one
recognizes the central importance of the rule of law for the viability of any
democratic transition, establishing guilt through the judiciary is worth the
political cost and effort. If vindicating the authority of the law is essential
for the consolidation of a democratic transition in authoritarian societies,
the integrity of the international system for the protection of human rights
is brought into question when unilateral forgiveness is chosen too
frequently as a result of domestic political calculations.
In countries where the military retains substantial influence after
relinquishing formal power, efforts to investigate and prosecute past
violations are likely to risk military discontent, rebellions or other
confrontations that weaken the authority of the civilian government.
Eventually, full accountability may be beyond the present strength of a
patently inadequate judicial machinery, and many judges may lack the
independence to convict the worst abusers. Yet, because judicial
accountability for state-sponsored and systematic disappearances, murder
and torture affirms values that are paramount in a democracy, govern-
ments should be expected to assume high political risks associated with
this process.21 The assumption that political risks are justifiable to
reinforce the rule of law is especially warranted when popular support in
favor of accountability significantly outnumbers those in favor of unilateral
forgiveness. 2 In brief, since upholding the rule of law, especially at the
21. See generally Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Obligation Under International
Law to Prosecute a Prior Regime's Human Rights Violations, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1991).
22. Popular support for accountability, at least at the outset of a new administration, is
a phenomenon common to many countries in which an elected civilian government succeeds
a military repressive government. See COUNTRY MONITORING SERVICE, ARGENTINA:
EXECUTIVE ASSESSMENT (Jan. 1991). Although this support is likely to wane as time
elapses and economic issues raise to greater public prominence in voters' minds, post-
authoritarian societies are not likely to forget so quickly the country's darkest years. Id.
On December 28, 1990, the day before President Menem announced that he was granting
a presidential pardon to Argentina's former military rulers and a leftist guerrilla leader, an
average of 80% of civilians polled were against the pardons. Id. In Chile, over 60% of
the population reportedly favored punishment of the offenses committed by the Pinochet
[Vol. I1I
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outset of a redemocratization process, is a sufficiently important value, its
vindication justifies requiring governments to risk military insubordination.
The risk is worth taking because, as long as fragile constitutional
governments continue to manipulate politics to circumvent the rule of law,
democracy cannot rest easy and political stability will never be assured.
It is obvious that international legal standards should not be so
inflexible that their implementation would make it more likely than not to
provoke the government's own collapse. I am suggesting that by requiring
some kind of accountability and condemning sweeping amnesty laws and
presidential pardons, which foreclose all kinds of prosecutions and judicial
processes, international law would help to ensure that governments do not
forego trials and forget the victims' pleas on the ground that it is
politically expedient to do so. This is why it is so important to identify
legal standards that bear on a government's approach to the accountability
for past human rights abuses. The values associated with punishing
institutionalized mass murder would be best secured if the efforts of
fledgling democracies were backed by unambiguous international rules.
Although there is no consensus at the present time about the precise
limitations of a government's policy toward past abuses, international law
already imposes some constraints on a government's discretion as it relates
to the punishment of egregious human rights violations.'
A branch of international criminal law has laid the foundations for the
jurisdictional powers of states to prosecute a specific category of
international crimes-the so-called "crimes against humanity." Although
in practice states have seldom used their authority to prosecute crimes
against humanity, it seems plausible to rely on those precedents in order
to shape international remedies for a state's inability or refusal to punish
its own officials for human rights violations committed against its own
citizens, or at least to constrain a state's discretion to amnesty serious and
systematic human rights violations.' Unfortunately, the concept of
"crimes against humanity" is shrouded with ambiguity, and this category
of crimes traditionally has been framed to be applicable only in connection
regime between 1973 and 1978. See Santiago, HOY, Sept. 17, 1989 (poll conducted by
Centro de Estudias Publicas).
23. For a thorough discussion of the legal normative premises of an international duty
to punish, see Orentichler, supra note 21, at 13-58; see Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility
to Investigate and Prosecute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78
CALIF. L. REv. 451 (1990).
24. In three important areas of international law-refugee, territorial asylum and
extradition-conventional law provides that crimes against humanity should not be accorded
the privileged status of political offenses. See G.A. Res. 429 (V), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 20) at 48-49, U.N. Doe. A/1775 (1950); see also G.A. Res. 2391 (XXIII), 23 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 40-41, U.N. Do. A/72/8 (1968).
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with international warfare.
International humanitarian law, either treaty-based or customary, also
establishes a set of fundamental rights that governments must respect
during the course of an armed conflict. Thus, the Geneva Conventions,
which were adopted in the aftermath of World War II, impose on state
parties an explicit duty to criminalize certain grievous violations of human
rights that are categorized as "grave breaches" to the Geneva
Conventions.' However, the duty to prosecute arising under the Geneva
Conventions only applies in the context of international warfare;27 those
conventions do not expressly restrict a state's ability to amnesty human
rights violations committed against its own citizens during a period of
internal conflict.'
Other conventions, such as the Genocide and Torture Conventions,
explicitly require state parties to investigate violations of particular rights
and to prosecute those who are responsible. These conventions do not
require that the violations be committed in connection with a crime against
peace or a war crime. 9  The provisions of the Genocide Convention
25. See Rodley, The International Legal Consequences of Torture, Extra-Legal
Execution, and Disappearance, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 167, 176-77 (E.
Lutz, H. Hannum & K. Burke ed. 1989); see also Carey, Procedures for International
Protection of Human Rights, 53 IOwA L. REv. 291, 299 (1967).
26. Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 makes clear that "grave breaches"
to the conventions must be prosecuted on the basis of universality of jurisdiction. The
Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 165 countries and entered into force on October
21, 1950. See Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of war,
August 21, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; see also
Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights: Classification and Chart
Showing Ratifications as of) January 1988, 9 HUM. RTS. L.J. 113, 132 (1988).
27. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 & n.9 3 (1989).
28. See De Shutter & Van De Wijngaert, Coping with Non-International Armed
Conflicts: The Borderline Between National and International Law, 13 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 279, 285-89 (1983). In its submission to the Chilean Supreme Court challenging
the 1978 amnesty, the Vicarfa General de a Solidaridad contended that Chile's ratification
of the Geneva Conventions prevented it from amnestying the torture and summary
executions committed during the country's state siege between 1973 and 1978. Id.
29. Convention on the Crime and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 227 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]; see also The Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted Dec.
(Vol. I I
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leave little doubt that a general amnesty of the offense of genocide would
contravene its provisions. However, a workable definition of genocide
requires an intent to "destroy" national, ethnic, racial or religious groups,
apparently excluding criminal offenses against political opponents or
dissidents.' The Convention Against Torture is a modern convention,
especially oriented to encourage the universal enforcement of a ban on
torture. This Convention includes unambiguous provisions obliging state
parties to institute criminal proceedings against alleged torturers." But
the Convention Against Torture did not come into force until 1987,32 and
a recent decision of the UN Committee on Torture decided that this
prohibition applies only with respect to acts of torture perpetrated after a
state becomes party to the Convention.33 Although the duty to punish
torturers is derived from customary international law established outside
the parameters of the Convention Against Torture,3 the foregoing
10, 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doe. A/39/51
(1985) (entered into force June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
30. Genocide Convention, supra note 29, art. II.
31. Moreover, article IV of the Convention Against Torture reflects a concern that
convicted torturers be punished in a way that is commensurate with the severity of the
offense. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, art. IV ("each State Party shall
make [acts of torture] punishable by appropriate penalties which take into account their
grave nature").
32. The Convention Against Torture was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1984,
entered into force in 1987, and has been ratified by twenty-eight countries. Marie, supra
note 26, at 132.
33. At its third session, the Committee Against Torture, a UN organ established by
article 17 of the Convention for the purpose of monitoring state parties' compliance with
the Convention, held inadmissible three communications challenging the adoption and
application of Argentina's "full stop" and "due obedience" laws. O.R., M.M. & M.S. v.
Argentina, Decisions of the Committee Against Torture Under Article 22 of the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 44
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 44) (Annex V) at 112, para. 9, U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990). Both
laws precluded to varying degrees the prosecution of military officers allegedly responsible
for torturing to death the relatives of the complainants. Id. Because those statutes had
been enacted after Argentina signed and ratified the Convention Against Torture, but before
the Convention entered into force, the Committee ruled that the Convention did not apply
to those legislative enactments. Id.
34. The proscription of torture has attained the status of customary international law
through its condemnation in numerous international instruments predating the entering into
force of the Convention Against Torture. See ES.C. Res. 663 (XXIV), 24 U.N. ESCOR
Supp. (No. 1) at 11, U.N. Doe. E/3048 (1957); see also Filirtiga v. Peila-Irala, 630 F.2d
876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[t]here are few, if any, issues in international law today on
which opinion seems to be so united as the limitations on a state's power to torture persons
.... "). "[D]eliberate torture perpetrated under color of official authority violates
universally accepted norms of international law of human rights, regardless of the
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decision by the UN Committee on Torture provides little hope for
institutional condemnation of national policies of amnesty or non-
prosecution of torture committed during the late 1970s.
Comprehensive international treaties for the protection of human rights
provide a set of broad principles that may serve as guideposts for
constraining the ability of states to enact domestic amnesties. In contrast
to the conventions on torture and genocide, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (International Covenant),35 the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention)' and the American Convention on
Human Rights (American Convention)37 do not explicitly require state
parties to prosecute or punish violations set forth in the conventions.
However, the general framework of these conventions and the
interpretations issued by the international bodies in charge of their
enforcement suggest that these treaties require state parties to investigate
serious human rights violations and to bring to justice those responsible.
To the extent that these conventions require state parties to "respect
and ensure" effective remedies against acts that violate human rights, it
has been argued that a state cannot claim to have respected and ensured
a right unless it prosecutes and punishes those who have violated it.3"
Thus, with respect to the International Covenant, a line of decisions
rendered by the UN Human Rights Committee has repeatedly stressed that
a state party's failure to investigate, prosecute and punish violations of
human rights protecting physical integrity, such as summary executions,
torture and unresolved disappearances, constitute a violation of the
International Covenant. 39
nationality of the parties .... " Id. at 881.
35. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966)
(entered into force on March 23, 1976).
36. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (1966) (entered into
force on Sept. 3, 1958).
37. American Convention on Human Rights, OEA/sCr.K/XVI/I. 1, doc. 65, rev. 1, corr.
1 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
38. Several legal scholars have found a legal duty to punish implicit in the state's
general duty to ensure rights. See Burgenthal, To Respect and to ensure: State Obligations
and Permissible Derogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 77 (L. Henkin ed.
1981) (arguing that the obligation to ensure rights creates affirmative obligations on the
state "to take whatever measures are necessary to enable individuals to enjoy or exercise
the rights guaranteed in the Covenant . . . for example, to discipline its officials and to
improve the administration of criminal justice").
39. Pursuant to article 40 of the International Covenant, states parties must prepare for
the Human Rights Committee's periodic reports describing efforts they have undertaken to
comply with the covenant. The Committee is directed to monitor such compliance,
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Several decisions of the European Court and Commission of Human
Rights suggest that both investigation and punishment play an important
role in the fulfillment of the contracting states' duties under the European
Convention. While the European Commission has refused to hear
applications seeking the prosecution of officials or persons alleged to
infringe the Convention's provisions,' in one case the European Court
found a 'contracting state responsible under the Convention because its
legal system failed to ensure the protection of an individual who had
violated the petitioner's right. 4
The most unambiguous, authoritative recognition of a duty to
investigate, prosecute and punish serious violations of those human rights
that protect physical integrity was issued by the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. In Veldsquez Rodrtguez, the Inter-American Court's first
controversial case, the Court found that under article 1(1) of the American
Convention, a state's duty to ensure the human rights listed in the
Convention includes an affirmative obligation to undertake a meaningful
investigation of violations of the Convention and to punish those
responsible.42 The Court did not specifically address the question of the
transmitting both the country reports and "such general comments as it may consider
appropriate" to the states parties, and, if the Committee wishes, to the Economic and Social
Council. See generally Schacter, The Obligation to Implement the Covenant in Domestic
Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 30.
40. The European Commission on Human Rights has left questions of remedial action
to be dealt with by the European Court of Human Rights. See Rodley, supra note 38, at
30.
41. X and Y v. Netherlands, 8 EUR. HUM. RTs. REP. 235 (1986) (finding the Dutch
government partly responsible for the complainant's long-term injuries for rape suffered
seven years earlier on the ground that Dutch law precluded the victim, who was mentally
handicapped, and her legal representatives from instituting criminal proceedings against her
attacker). The European Court rejected the claim of the Dutch government to the effect
that the petitioner's ability to seek civil reparation discharged the government's duties under
the Convention. Id. at 240-41. The Court noted that the Delegate of the European
Commission of Human Rights had found that the need for protection existed erga omnes,
while an injunction could only be directed to a limited circle of persons ... [and that] the
civil law lacked the deterrent effect that was inherent in the criminal law; see Orentichler,
supra note 21, at 43-45.
42. Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez, 1988, INTER-AM. C.H.R., OEA/ser.C/4, para. 174
(holding that article 1(1) of the American Convention imposes on each state party a "legal
duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its
disposal to carry out serious investigations of violations committed within its jurisdiction,
to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to insure the victim
adequate compensation. .... "). Article 1(1) of the American Convention provides in part:
"The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and the freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full
exercise of those rights and freedoms . . . ." Id. In this first decision, rendered in July
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legitimacy of amnesty laws enacted by previous governments, but it
clearly indicted that a new government is internally responsible for
unredressed violations of international law attributable to its
predecessor."
As an organ of the Organization of American states, the Inter-
American Commission has repeatedly recommended offending member
states during the 1970s to "order a thorough and impartial investigation"
of human rights violations involving physical integrity, as well as to
punish the individuals responsible in accordance with domestic law." It
remains to be seen whether, as an organ of the American Convention on
Human Rights and in the pending cases challenging amnesty laws, the
Inter-American Commission will avail itself of the opportunity to refer the
complainants to the Inter-American Court, while at the same time
affirming the international duty to punish massive extra-legal executions,
torture and disappearances against the historical precedent of absolute
national sovereignty in criminal law enforcement.
TEITEL: In order to conclude the discussion on the question of
accountability, I thought I would ask Jaime (Malamud-Goti), who, in the
1980s, was the Argentine president's senior advisor on human rights, to
speak on the relevance of criminal law, and on the purpose of initiating
trials and engaging a criminal law response to crimes that have been
committed on such a wide scale. Why, in cases such as this, does the
responsibility rest with the collective society? What is the purpose
1988, the Court found the Honduran government responsible for the disappearance of
Manfredo VelAsquez Rodriguez. Id. In January 1989, the Court faulted Honduras for the
disappearance of Saul Godinez Cruz in 1982. Id. A subsequent decision held the evidence
insufficient to blame Honduras for the disappearances in 1981 of Costa Rican citizens
Francisco Fairdn Garbi and Yolanda Solis Corrales. Id.
43. Id. para. 184 ("According to the principle of continuity of the state in international
law, responsibility exists both independently of changes in government over a period of
time, and continuously from the time of the act which creates responsibility to the time
when the act is declared illegal. The foregoing is also valid in the area of human rights,
although, from an ethical or political point of view, the attitude of the new government may
be much more respectful of those rights than that of the government in power when the
violations occurred.").
44. Case 1870, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 52-54, OEA/ser.L./V./ll. 43, doc. 21 rev. 1 (1978);
Case 2126, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 77-82, OEA/ser.L.IV./II. 47, doe. 3 rev. 1 (1979) (Chile);
Case 2088, INTER-AM. C.H.R. 38-42, OEA/ser.L./V./Il. 50, doc. 13 rev. 1 (1980)
(Argentina). Despite these decisions, in 1986 the Commission expressed a general
inclination to leave to the discretion of national governments the question of the legitimacy
of amnesty laws enacted by previous governments, subject to the qualification that the truth
about the past violations must be fully known. INTER-AM. C.H.R. 1985-1986,
OEA/ser.L./Il. 68, doc. 8, rev. 1 (1986).
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of punishment in this context and what are its probable effects?
JAIME MALAMUD-GOTI: In some ways, Luis (Ocampo) has already
dealt with the issue. I cannot help but recall the story of Peron and the
British ambassador to Argentina. Sometime in the early 1950s, the British
embassy in Buenos Aires was surrounded by hoards of demonstrators.
Responding to the ambassador's complaint, Peron asked him, "Would
you like me to send in more police?" and the ambassador replied, "No,
I would like you to send less demonstrators." Similarly, in establishing
democracy, a primary goal would have been achieved had society's
authoritarian leanings been substantially lessened. Given a choice between
such an achievement and sentencing human rights transgressors one would
assume that a vast majority of true democrats would vote for the first
option. I would predict, however, that a lack of coercive measures against
state criminals will also frustrate attempts to "de-authoritarianize" society.
The exercise of individual rights can hardly be expected from a vast and
subdued sector of society. A general lack of self-respect among the
citizenry is usually one of the heaviest legacies of dictatorships. The
paradox posed by this fact is inescapable. Prospects of justice depend on
a community's sense of moral responsibility, and this sense is largely
derived from social institutions. In reality it seems highly likely that the
stronger the call for justice, the more impaired by authoritarianism will be
those institutions on which justice is grounded. Allotting responsibility
among the officials of authoritarian regimes and setting up an institutional
system that ensures the rights of individuals seem to be complementary yet
often conflicting tasks.
Broadly speaking, two approaches to justice have direct bearing on the
processes of moving towards democracy and adjudicating responsibility to
human rights violators of previous repressive regimes. The first approach
to justice that can be adopted by a transitional government is that of
setting up a political system that allots benefits and burdens in conformity
with socially accepted moral standards. In the context of human rights
violations, this approach is connected either to retributive sentiments or to
the deterrent effects of punishment. I have elsewhere discredited attempts
to attach dissuasive effect to punishing state criminals, largely because
whatever form a deterrent effect may take, experience shows that it is
strongly overridden by competing encouragement from the perpetrator's
comrades and supporters.4 This version of justice is therefore primarily
grounded on the retributive sentiments that human rights abuses provoke.
Consequently, its results lie in the value attached to the fulfillment of
expectations originated in these sentiments. Regaining self-respect and
45. See Malatnud-Goti, Transitional Governments in the Breach: Why Punish State
Criminals?, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 1, 10 (1990).
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dignity and demonstrating respect for victims are among the most visible
consequences of this form of justice. According to this approach,
retribution and, more specifically, retributive sanctions are forward-
looking and therefore immune to the allegation that they have no bearing
on social institutional life thereby lacking political justification. '
Through retributive measures, individuals regain self-respect and
confidence in institutions, which enables them to participate in a rights-
based community.
A second approach to justice is that of setting up a political system in
which basic liberties are better protected and exercised. Social peace and
basic legal and economic equality are not only the final and supreme goals
of justice, but also, to some extent, the institutional prerequisite of the
attainment of such goals. As I pointed out earlier, gross inequalities and
privilege strongly affect our respect for ourselves, thus upsetting our
judgement as to what our rights are. Without basic, forceful democratic
institutions, it seems difficult to conceive how retribution could avoid
extreme violence. In institutional deserts such as Guatemala and Haiti, it
is hard to conceive how a drive toward justice could avoid extreme
violence, capable of igniting further conflict.
The extent to which both faces of justice can be attained depends
largely on empirical bases that comprehend the balance of forces that
transitional governments confront and on a diversity of national institution-
al traditions. By this token, rights can only be restored effectively within
the process of consolidating enduring institutions that ensure the respect
of individuals.
I. THE CIRCUMVENTION OF ACCOUNTABILITY
TEITEL: The question of non-punishment, which almost all of our panel
have mentioned as a reality in their countries, is now ripe for analysis.
The last several years have seen frequent declarations of amnesty, or
de facto amnesty as some have called it, in Latin America. The question
really is, what have been the reasons for the non-punishment, for the
declarations of amnesty? I would like to ask the representatives on the
panel from Argentina, Uruguay and Chile to respond to these questions:
Are all amnesties the same? What does it mean to have limits on
punishment; are those de facto amnesties? What are, if any, acceptable
limits on the punishment of such large crimes? I think I will start with
Luis (Ocampo) in regard to Argentina. In Argentina, legislation was
46. The distinction between punishment as a social institution and the adjudication of
criminal sanctions was emphasized by H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY




passed which established the due obedience law (punto final law) through
two different theories which worked to end trials. One such theory
concerned people who only followed orders. These people would not be
tried at all. The other theory involved a statute of limitations. The
question is: the word amnesty is not in the law, but is this in essence an
amnesty? What about the pardons recently granted by President Merem?
Can we draw distinctions in terms of the effect and the response of the
criminal law in these cases?
OCAMPO: First of all, I would like to say that under no circumstances
in Chile or Uruguay can a judge punish a member of the military while
the military is in power. This simply cannot and will not happen. The
military has full power to replace the judge and the judge has absolutely
no power to imprison a member of the military. In order for legal
procedures to have any sense at all, one needs to have a democratic
government in place. When one moves from a totalitarian or authoritarian
system to a democratic system, one of the central issues that must be
resolved is the denouncing of the arbitrary acts committed under the
totalitarian regime. The new democratic government must decide whether
to investigate and punish, or whether to create a system of amnesty. If
one opts for investigation and punishment, -then there is another issue that
one must grapple with and that is the question of how far to proceed with
the investigation and the punishment. As I said before, the issue of
punishment is great when there are many people who are at fault. For
instance, in Argentina, if we had wanted to punish all of those who were
at fault, we would have had to punish the military, bishops, bankers,
businessmen, diplomats and some judges. So one must make a choice.
In Argentina, that choice was made and it was decided that the principals
would be punished and those who carried out the tortures would also be
punished. So the trial began with the commanders.
One of the crucial problems concerning amnesty is that when an
amnesty law is put forth the government never actually gives the reasons
why such a law is being promulgated. Governments speak of limiting the
whole process and of reconciliation within the government, but the true
reasons are different. The central issue is that the government recognizes
that it does not have control over the military, over the intelligence organs
and over the secret police. In democracies that have been in place for a
long time, no one questions this point. It is taken for granted that the
justice system controls the police and the military. This is not the case in
a system where there is an ongoing transition to democracy. Governments
set limits for amnesty because they realize they do not have sufficient
power to control the military. This is a problem of power which is very
different in different countries-in Argentina it was different than in
Guatemala.
The international system establishes duties for punishment that should
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be in place. In order for this to be carried out, in fact, one would have
to have an international body that would help the countries in administer-
ing their own justice, or that administers punishment through international
tribunals. Otherwise, the international system is a mere legalism; the
legalism is that the law has changed reality and nothing more.
TEITEL: I now want to turn to the situation in Uruguay. We have heard
about the question of military power. We have also started by talking
about how democracy means having an election and an elected regime.
In Uruguay, there was a nation-wide referendum in which the people
voted to uphold the amnesty law, La Ley de Calissidad. This title does
not contain the word amnesty, but the law itself certainly provides that
there should be no trials. My questions are: Is it possible to have a
democratic amnesty? Is it possible to have a constitutional amnesty? Did
a constitutional majority of the Uruguayan people decide that they wanted
to put the past behind them? Is there a political reality of a military power
which influences the people's choice? Lastly, was there truly an election
of an amnesty law in Uruguay?
MICHELINI: The translation for the name of this law is difficult. In
English, it could be translated as "expiration of the state political
authority" or "exception of the political deprivation of the state" or that
"the state power to order and prosecute has lapsed." There are many
choices and I think that the best translation is "the impunity law." There
was no way to judge anyone. Even the law has exceptions. One is that
this expiration of state power to punish does not pertain to those crimes
committed with the object of personal gain. The law is applied only to
those crimes committed before June 27, 1973."'
In fact, in Uruguay, no one was investigated, no one was punished.
I believe that the law was passed due to the results of strict majority rule.
I think that those who really wanted justice could put Uruguayans who had
committed gross violations of human rights in jail, at least, for some time.
There was, however, no agreement on a way in which to accomplish this,
and so the regular consensus was not able to agree on a strategy. The
political consensus did not work because, in the first instance, some
Uruguayans thought, and still think, that nothing happened. They believe
that a struggle against communism took place and that those who were
damaged in the struggle were Communists. Even today, after the two-
year referendum campaign, some people say, "In Uruguay, these things
just go on in the movies and not in your neighborhood." Other people
believe that there were only errors. For instance, General Balina claimed
that there were errors. In other words, it is permissible to kill people, but
47. See L. WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 170-71.
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not to make mistakes while doing so, and perhaps, in some cases, there
were mistakes. The law was also retained because the military was able
to lobby all of Uruguayan society. So you have to recognize the military
as an important group of people that counts in terms of majority rule.
Another problem was that there was much dissension among the
people who wanted justice. Some of them said that the idea of justice is
good, but to judge is not. Others claimed that there was an unwritten pact
to the effect that enacting this amnesty law was necessary to attain
democracy. I think that was why the law was upheld. The referendum
was a reaction on the part of the relatives of the victims, not an act of the
political elite. This is not the desirable way to settle this point. I think,
however, that in terms of international leaders of the Uruguayan state,
matters have not changed much. Perhaps Professor Garro is the person
to answer this. Nevertheless, for Uruguayan society to be able to discuss
the past two years and what happened to the victims and to have the
opportunity to vote was better than to have impunity without revenge.
TEITEL: I will ask Roberto (Garraton Merino) to discuss the same
question. Is a majority choosing amnesty in Chile?
MERINO: In discussing whether or not amnesties are similar, I think we
have to look at what the amnesty sought to achieve. There are two
interested parties here, those who violate human rights, who do so
convinced that they can do it with impunity, and hence seek out impunity,
and the victims who are in search of truth and justice. The amnesty law
is nothing less but the final right of impunity when every other recourse
fails.
In this context, we should recall the order given by Hitler called
"Night and Fog." This order contained the following instructions: arrest
people at night, do not leave a trace of what has been done and carry
people away in the fog. This is exactly the same thing that was done in
Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala and Chile.
If anything goes awry, then an amnesty law is passed. I am referring
to the self-amnesties. On the other hand, we have the interest of the
victims who are interested in justice and in truth. Truth is something
more complex than possessing some knowledge of what happened in each
case. In Chile, the military alleges that there were no violations of human
rights and that a war took place. So we are interested in proving not only
the existence of violations of human rights, but also that there was no war.
The military is terrified of this because they know only too well that there
was no war.
This is the context in which these laws were created. The amnesty
laws were drafted and ratified by the democratic governments because the
military, which still possessed a great deal of power, strongly pressured
them to take such actions. That is why our frustrations are roused. In the
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final analysis, I believe that the amnesty laws are intrinsically the same,
although in detail they may be different, because they result in the same
lack of justice. We as a people must then find other formulas to bring out
the truth, the historical truth, when our initial efforts fail.
GARRO: Although the governments of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay
have claimed that the pardons were necessary for national reconciliation,
there is no doubt that the most likely goal was to appease a dangerously
discontented military." In my view, the long-term goal of promoting
consolidation of a democratic transition is better served by relying on the
prudent judgement of the courts of law, even at the cost of risking the
destabilizing effects allegedly associated with prosecutions, than by
disguising the pardons as a morally edifying act of clemency.49
Granted that in many instances full accountability is not realistically
possible, some measure of accountability should be warranted for
especially egregious human rights, such as forced disappearances and
torture. It is not easy to determine whether the process of accountability
should consist of a program of limited or selected prosecution of a handful
48. At least this was the primary motive that led President Radl Alfonsin to restrict the
timing and scope of the prosecutions through the enactment of the full stop law on
December 21, 1986, and the due obedience law on June 17, 1987. See supra note 15 and
accompanying text. It is less clear what the real motives were, other than blatant political
opportunism, behind the presidential pardons granted by Carlos Menem on October 7, 1987
and December 3, 1990. Id. The preamble to the Chilean amnesty law of 1978 took note
of "the general tranquility, peace and order" which the country supposedly enjoyed. Id.
However, when General Augusto Pinochet, after 16 years of military rule, was prepared
to turn the Chilean government over to President Alwyin, he warned: "No one is going to
touch my people. The day they do, the rule of law will come to an end." AMERICAS
WATCH, CHILE IN TRANSITION: HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE PLEBESCITE 988-89 (1989).
In Uruguay, the amnesty law came about as a result of an agreement signed in 1984, the
Naval Club Pact, entered into between the armed forces and some Uruguayan political
forces. AMERICAS WATCH, CHALLENGING IMPUNITY 11-15 (1989). It was known, though
never publicly confirmed, that the parties to the Pact agreed that the Executive branch of
the future elected government would not itself prosecute members of the security forces for
human rights violations, although it would not interfere with the adjudication of such cases
by civilian courts. Id. Shortly after President Sanguinetti took office, victims of human
rights violations brought legal proceedings against military and police personnel. Id. When
the military court's challenged the civilian court's assertion of jurisdiction over all armed
forces personnel, the Supreme Court of Uruguay in November 1986 upheld, the civilian
court's claim to jurisdiction in two key cases implicating members of the military. Id.
When the civilian courts summoned military defendants to appear, and in the face of reports
the minister of defense had ordered the military officers not to show up in court, President
Sanguinetti rushed to obtain legislative approval of the Ley de Caducidad in order to avert
what he called an "imminent institutional crisis." Id.
49. Amnesty at the Point of a Gun Isn't Genuine, N.Y. Times, Apr. 10, 1990, at A20,
col. 6 (letter to the editor).
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of military leaders, or whether it should also include junior, mid-level
officers and civilians who failed to report to such crimes. However,
regardless of which option is chosen, the fact that it is not feasible to
prosecute every conceivable offender should not result in the whitewashing
of gross and systematic state-sponsored violations of physical integrity.
The realm of governmental discretion should not be limitless, and the
judiciary should be given the opportunity to decide what is legally correct.
It has been argued that governmental policy addressing past human
rights abuses "must be approved in a manner that reflects the will of the
people."' According to this rationale, there should be no legal obstacles
to a sweeping amnesty approved by a parliamentary majority, by a freely-
elected president or by a national referendum. I think that it is highly
questionable that a political majority should be allowed to determine if the
victims of human rights violations should be allowed to vindicate their
rights before the courts, especially in view of the fact that the kind of
egregious violations that should not escape punishment constitute violations
to all states (erga omnes) and not merely to the individual victims. 5
Moreover, the very purpose of the modern international law of human
rights is to ensure individual victims that their rights will be vindicated.52
50. See Zalaquett, supra note 20, at 34.
51. See M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD
PUBL1C ORDER 354 (1980); see also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company
Limited, 1970 I.C.J. 3, paras. 33-34 ("In view of the importance of the rights involved,
all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga
ornes. In contemporary international law for example, some obligations derive from the
outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules
concerning the basic rights of human person, including protection from slavery and racial
discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of protection have entered into the body
of general international law . . ").
52. Supranational bodies have recognized the erga omnes character of human rights
obligations, while stressing at the same time the important role of individual victims. Thus,
in discussing human rights treaties, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights noted that
"their object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings,
irrespective of their nationality and all other contracting States. In concluding these human
rights treaties, the states can be deemed to submit themselves to a legal order within which
they, for the common good, assume various obligations, not in relation to other states, but
towards all individuals within their jurisdiction." The Effect of Reservations on Entry into
Force of the American Convention (arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion of September 24,
1982, INTER-AM. C.H.R. ser. A, No. 92, at 6, para. 29, reprinted in 3 HUM. RTS. L.J.
153 (1982). For a similar pronouncement by the European Commission on Human Rights,
see Austria v. Italy, Application No. 788/60, 4 Y.B. EUR. CON. ON HUM. RTS. 116,
para. 140 (1961) (finding that the obligations of the parties to the European Convention are
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Clearly, the preclusion of civil remedies to the victims would make
illusory the state's obligations to respect, ensure and redress violations of
guaranteed rights. Arguably, the state's failure to criminally prosecute
and punish state officials who-had systematically violated the right to life
and physical integrity would also leave the community of nations
unprotected against future violations.
ANDERSON: I agree with that account. For the sake of argument, I will
assume that we have two options. We are new leaders of an effective
government. We are democratic and were given the option of trying the
military by military court. We can try them entirely by military court, by
their own procedures and standards, or we can try just a few military
officers by a regular civilian court. I would think that the main question
here is whether we are going to perpetuate democracy in some way or
another.
The fact is, that, given the subject, I would certainly opt for trying
military officers before a civilian court. We are in a very peculiar
situation because the reason for punishing the generals or the colonels is
not the same reason for punishing an ordinary criminal or an ordinary
sharpshooter who kills someone with his rifle. We are trying to establish
an equilibrium, and we try in some way or another to modify an
arrangement according to which some people are never held accountable
by the same rules we are. While these rules are perhaps more severe,
they are, nevertheless, different. That is the issue. I think that when we
try a murderer or an arsonist we are not trying someone who has subdued
another person. We are not trying a class of people that has actually
degraded other human beings. When we try someone such as a rapist or
a blackmailer or a perpetrator who subdues the victim and subjects the
victim to his desires, to his will, thus reducing the autonomy of the victim
to a minimum-we are in fact seeing a small sample of what takes place
when a state has become a criminal state.
The problem is one of choosing a means of restoring dignity to
citizens. Are we going to restore a sense of equality just by trying the
military or are we going to try to restore a sense of equality just by trying
the chief of the band that permitted blackmail or do we have to try them
all? I believe that the first task is to restore dignity by restoring the
equilibrium between those who have suffered abuse and those who
committed it. The second task is to restore it by means of applying the
same rules, the same tribunal or at least the same standard to all.
"essentially of an objective character, being designed rather to protect the fundamental




III. ACHIEVING ACCOUNTABILITY BY ALTERNATIVE MEANS
TEITEL: That brings us to the next question: what are the objectives that
the criminal justice system sought to achieve? The real issue is the extent
to which the response of the national criminal law system is necessary to
achieve the objectives of restoring dignity and rights to victims. The last
question pertains to the issue of alternatives (i.e., punishment, pardons),
and whether some of the objectives of the criminal justice system can be
met by other methods, if the reality in Latin America is that trials cannot
be brought. We have seen the unravelling in Argentina of trials against
the military commanders. Some have distinguished between the truth
objective and the justice objective of the criminal justice system. I believe
that some alternatives exist such as civil actions as opposed to criminal
justice and military courts as opposed to state courts. However, does
choosing one alternative over another make a difference? For instance,
if the state cannot bring trials in civilian courts, is it feasible for the
military to police themselves in military tribunals? Also, can both the
state and private parties continue to initiate actions if there is an absence
of political will? What about these criminal actions initiated by private
parties? In Latin America, there are a number of countries which have
this procedure. In our system of civil law, much of what we recover after
injury is monetary compensation. Does this offer an alternative to
punishment? Is there a possibility of civil actions in these countries? To
what extent is international law a possible system for responding to either
criminal or civil accountability? Lastly, with respect to issues of truth and
fact-finding, are there other ways to establish histories, facts, records of
what went on? Is the amnesty or failure of criminal accountability really
going to literally be an amnesty, a forgetting of the past in those
countries?
OCAMPO: I believe that the best alternative is the punishment of those
responsible. If one can send those responsible to jail, it must be done.
A very bad alternative is to attempt to send them to jail and not to be able
to do it. This would mean that the democracy is powerless and the
military has the power. That is why, to conclude my discussion with
Professor Garro, the question of morality and right are mixed with issues
of law. Questions of power are very thorny indeed because it is very
difficult to discuss power when one side has it and the other does not.
I think there are alternatives to legal punishment and I think the
Chilean people should seek out these alternatives because they will be
unable to punish in accordance with the penal law. Post-war Germany
offers a very interesting example in this connection. Those land owners
whose properties had not been destroyed by bombing contributed money
to the establishment of a fund for those individuals whose houses had been
demolished by bombs. This has two important aspects. First of all, it
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helps the person who has been victimized, and more importantly, the
society as a whole becomes responsible for the victims' welfare. To this
day, there are people in Argentina who think, "Well I really didn't have
any problems during the military regime so those people who did must
have done something and that is why it happened to them." A program
like this would prove that, just as in Germany, where it was mere
coincidence that a bomb did not demolish one's house, in Argentina, it
was mere coincidence that some people were not victimized by the
military government.
MERINO: In my previous talk, I mentioned two different groups, the
military, who acted with impunity, and the victims. These two groups do
not amount to five percent of the population. The problem is what
happens to the other ninety-five percent. They are the people who move
power in one direction or the other. In Chile, we needed a greater portion
of that ninety-five percent to support our views than we received. This
is why we must look to alternatives. For example, an investigatory
commission is being created; its weakness is that it lacks the power of a
court, but its strength is that it can investigate areas that are not technical-
ly considered crime.
If the truth was established in a definitive way, some reparations
would be in order. Although the victims have rejected monetary
compensation or indemnification as a substitute for the truth, this has
nothing to do with trying those responsible.
TEITEL: If there are reparations, would they come from the state or
private parties? If they come from private parties, there is a sense of
allocating responsibility. What do you have in mind for Chile?
MERINO: We are thinking of reparations by the state, which would
represent a judicial continuation of the unity of the state. The state
presumes that it was a prior government, a prior illegal government, that
committed the crimes. It is therefore a national problem, which must be
compensated by the state.
ANDERSON: In Guatemala, there are no reparations because there have
been no crimes, nor guilty parties in the eyes of the government. Also,
I think that, in general, the participants in this panel are subconsciously
making a calculation about the power of the army, the police and the
intelligence services. There is also talk that we are telling ourselves that
we would like to punish the culprits to the extent that our power will
permit.
I think that this calculation is often construed as an engagement on our
part in the process of national reconciliation and national healing. It is
thought that if we have full power to prosecute, throw people in jail,
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punish them, do whatever it is we deem just and necessary, then we would
also be in a position to say, "since we can do it to anyone we choose, we
are only going to do it to fifty percent, or we are only going to do it to
leaders, or we are only going to do it to the top commanders." Then we
conclude that if we are going to punish only the top commanders under
circumstances in which we have full power, then that is really the same
thing as punishing it only to the top commanders under circumstances in
which we do not have full power. I think that this equivalence is
completely mistaken because in the case where you do have full power to
punish, but choose not to, you had the ability to engage in an act of
forgiveness. Under circumstances in which you do not have that full
power, and the extent to which you engage in justice is determined by
your calculation of how much power the opposing military still retains,
then, under these circumstances, you are not engaged in an act of mercy
or an act of forgiveness at all. Rather, you are engaged in an act of
capitulation.
And I am uncomfortably aware that it is very easy for me to sit in
New York City and denounce justice. I also think it is quite true that the
people that are represented here have to deal with the facts of power all
the time and have to deal with those calculations. However, I think that
it is very important to make clear that it is a pragmatic judgment being
made in relation to power instead of pretending that it is a process of
national reconciliation, as if one has power that one does not have.
MICHELINI: In Uruguay, the alternative to an amnesty law was the
referendum. It is true that we lost the referendum but I believe that we
obtained important things despite this loss. No one supporting the idea of
the amnesty law denied that crimes were committed by the military
regime, and not one of them presented any argument to justify those
crimes. If the military wanted the Uruguayan people to forget what
happened through the amnesty law, they did not succeed.
The movement supporting the idea to repeal the amnesty law had a
significant degree of support from young people. It is very important that
the youth understand what democracy should be like in Uruguay. During
the election of 1984, the human rights issue was very important to the
people. I think that was an improvement. We have dealt with the issue
of human rights in some cases that were brought in the civil court.
However, these were very few in number because, just as in Chile,
people did not want monetary compensation for immoral acts. Neverthe-
less, I think that these civil claims are a way of obtaining some truth and
some justice.
GARRO: Monetary compensation is certainly one appropriate mode of
reparation for human rights violations. However, financial compensation
may not be the appropriate remedy in cases of gross and systematic
1990]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
violations of the right to life. Under those circumstances, the damage
suffered by the international community would be best assured by the
prosecution and punishment of the offenders. Upon finding Honduras
responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo Veldsquez Rodrfguez and
Sadl Godfnez Cruz, the Inter-American Court ordered Honduras to pay
1,400,000 lempiras ($280,000) to the victims' families. The Court did not
direct the Honduran government to institute criminal proceedings against
those responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo VelAsquez, but it did
stress the duty of the Honduran government to clarify his fate and to
inform the victim's relatives of the results of these efforts, an obligation
that persists as long as the victim's fate remains uncertain. 3  In a
subsequent decision aimed at fixing the amount of the compensation owed
to the relatives of the victim, the Court noted once again that Honduras
remained bound to prevent future disappearances and to investigate and
punish those responsible for the disappearance of Manfredo Vel~squez.'
Most domestic laws provide that an amnesty adopted by Parliament
or a presidential pardon does not preclude the availability of civil actions
seeking monetary compensation directly against the wrongdoers or against
the state for wrongful acts or omissions of its security forces.55 Howev-
er, there are three major obstacles in pursuing such claims against the
state. First, as pointed out by Mr. Garret6n with respect to Chile, the
next-of-kin of the disappeared have been generally reluctant to bring civil
suits seeking monetary compensation for the loss of family members.
Second, the short statute of limitations applicable to tort actions bars the
overwhelming majority of cases that are based on human rights violations
committed by the security forces during the period of de facto military
governments.' Third, civilian courts would almost certainly need to
compel the personal testimony of, and/or the production of documents
from, members of the security forces in order to find the state or its
agents liable for damages, and precluding this disclosure was the primary
motive behind the use of the amnesty laws and presidential pardons.
53. VelAsquez Rodriguez, Manfredo, INTER-AM C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./III. 19, doe.
13 (1988).
54. Manfredo Veldsquez Rodriguez, Indemnizacitrn Compensatoria, July 21, 1989, para.
34-36.
. 55. See, e.g., Constitution of Uruguay, arts. 24-25 (1967) (providing for the liability
of the State for torts committed by its employees in the performance of their duties or by
reason of such performance); Argentine Criminal Code, art. 61 (amnesty does not preclude
civil liability) and art. 68 (presidential pardon oe indulto does not preclude civil liability);
Chilean Criminal Code, art. 93 (civil liability not affected by amnesty law).
56 See, e.g., Argentine Civil Code, art. 4037 (two year period of limitations for actions
arising out of torts); Chilean Civil Code, art. 2332 (four years); Uruguayan Civil Code,
art. 1332 (four years).
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Assuming that the running of the statute of limitations might be
justified for civil actions emerging from human rights violations, the
limitations period should provide a reasonable time for the victims or their
relatives to institute civil proceedings. Arguably, in these cases, the
statute of limitations should not begin to run until the beginning of the
civilian government, since it was dangerous and sometimes impossible for
victims to seek legal redress against the state for the acts of its agents
during the military government. Not surprisingly, in order to avoid the
disclosure of the facts and culprits of the "dirty war," the Supreme Court
of Argentina held in 1988 that victims of human rights abuses were
estopped from bringing civil claims against military officers beyond the
two-year limitation period, which was established in article 4037 of the
Argentine Civil Code. Although article 3980 of the Civil Code exempts
the running of the limitation period "for reasons of factual difficulties or
impossibility" to bring suit, the Supreme Court held that the courts
remained open during the years of the military government and the statute
of limitations could not be tolled.57 The victims brought a complaint
before the Inter-American Commission on Human rights, and in order to
settle the case, the Argentine government was compelled to issue a decree
providing monetary compensation for those victims.
GARRO: I think that one of the most important post-Nuremberg
developments for international human rights law is the concept of
"universal jurisdiction," that is, the acceptance that certain egregious
offenses committed in one state constitute a legitimate concern for others,
to the point of recognizing states' rights to prosecute those crimes
regardless of where those crimes were committed." Whereas the
assertion of universal jurisdiction has been traditionally limited to crimes
against humanity," recent court decisions signal a trend to ensure
prosecution of internationally recognized human rights when the state
where the violations took place fails to bring the violators to account. The
principle of universal jurisdiction is embodied in the Convention Against
Torture,' and it has been invoked by a French and a U.S. court for
exercising jurisdiction, respectively, in a criminal action against an
Argentine naval officer6 and a civil action against an Argentine army
57. See DiCola Silvia v. Argentine National Government, Docket No. D.394.XXI, Aug.
16, 1988.
58. See generally K. RANDALL, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS PARADIGM, 163 (1990); Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law,
66 TEX. L. REv. 785, 785 (1988).
59. See 25 U.N. ESCOR Commission on Human Rights at 10, paras. 25,29, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/983 (1969).
60. Convention Against Torture, supra note 29, art. 5(2).
61. In March 1990, the Cour d'Assises du Paris sentenced in absentia Captain Alfredo
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officer.'
TEITEL: I have not heard mention of the role of the Catholic church in
Latin America. Latin America has the largest Roman Catholic Population
in the world. In 1986, the Vatican passed a decree to promote coopera-
tion between the armed forces in Catholic countries and the church. In
fact, in Argentina, there are an overwhelming number of priests and
bishops in the military. How does this doctrine affect the situation?
GARRO: The role and influence of the Catholic church during the years
of military repression in Latin America must be examined country-by-
country. On the one hand, the oldest and strongest human rights
organization in the Southern Cone, the Vicarla de la Solidaridad in Chile,
is supported by the Catholic church. On the other hand, the Catholic
church in Argentina, with the exception of a few notable bishops and
priests, remained conspicuously silent during the "dirty war."
MERINO: First of all, we did not speak about the church because we did
not believe it to be the topic at hand. In any event, the reality of the
churches is different in each country. It varies from the Catholic church
in Argentina to the popular church of Nicaragua. In the case of Chile,
there are churches, particularly the Catholic church, that are protecting
human rights. The body for which I worked, the Vicarta de la Solidari-
dad, is part of the archbishop's church of Santiago. We never asked any
of the people who came to speak to us about their religious or party
alliances. Within the Vicarta itself, we had Atheists, Baptists, Lutherans,
Astiz to life imprisonment for the disappearance in Argentina of two French nuns-Alice
Domon and lonie Duquet. Astiz, tortonnaire argentin, jugi par contumace, Liberation,
Mar. 16, 1990, at 13; Alfredo Astiz: Losfranceses noperdonan, P.gina 12, Mar. 26, 1990,
at 9. Cuestionable sentencia exitranjera, La Prensa, Mar. 26, 1990, at 10. Trial
proceedings against Astiz were initiated in Argentina in 1985 for the disappearance of the
French nuns and the illegal arrest and killing of a young woman of dual Argentine and
Swedish nationality. On December 5, 1986, a Federal Court of Appeals had dismissed the
case on the grounds that the six year statute of limitations for the crime of illegal detention
had expired. AMNESTY INT'L, REPORT OF THE TRIAL OF THE FORMER JUNTA MEMBERS-
ARGENTINA 1985,at 23 (1987). Captain Astiz became a prisoner of war of the British
during the hostilities in the South Atlantic in 1982, but Great Britain decided to repatriate
him to Argentina after the end of the hostilities. See Meyer, Liability of Prisoners of War
for Offenses Committed Prior to Capture: The Astiz Affair, 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 948,
948 (1983); The Case of Captain Astiz, 28 REVIEW 3 (June 1982).
62. Forti v. SuArez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 711 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing universal
proscription of "causing disappearance" in support of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort
Statute over tort claims against Argentine high-ranking army officers for offenses inflicted
on Argentine citizens in Argentina).
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Catholics-and this is the body to which the people had access and to
which the people sought out during those sixteen years. I am not familiar
with the particular decree of which you speak, and, while I continue to
look for it in order to read it, I know that it was not applied to Chile.
OCAMPO: These things cannot be viewed in terms of black and white.
It is very difficult to talk about the church. To put it another way, to
prove that you cannot see it in terms of black and white, the military
believed that they were fighting against communism. They could not
believe that President Carter, who was the president of the United States,
could abuse them. However, after the wheat emargo, they made an
alliance with the Soviet Union, which protected them in the United
Nations.
Although they fought against communism, the president of the United
States was their enemy and the Soviets were their ally. When speaking
of the church the same thing happened-there were bishops who opposed
the repression and one of them was actually killed. However, there were
also those bishops who were the spiritual counselors, advisors and
supporters of the military. In other words, they aided and abetted in the
murders that were committed by the military. For example, the bishop
who was the leader of the Castrensa region was flagrantly pro-military.
This is why I think this papal order or guideline is very bad; the military
has always been isolated, but they also have spiritual leaders that are
isolated with them.
MICHELINI: The church in Uruguay has an important role in the
protection of human rights. It is true that some parts of it were not so
enthusiastic in this protection and tried to stop their comrades from
working in the human rights field. The reality is that one of the most
important non-governmental organizations, Justice and Peace, had a very
important role and still has a role.
TEITEL: Jaime (Malamud-Goti) was saying that the church in Uruguay
did not have much importance in this relationship with the state, but that
in terms of human rights, it was very important.
ANDERSON: The situation in Guatemala was slightly different. Guatema-
la is probably the most heavily Protestant country in Latin America. The
Roman Catholic church in Guatamala was, and is, divided, as it has been
in many different places in the world, between the conservatives and the
liberals. Furthermore, there was a growing Protestant population that was
principally fundamentalist and directed from the United States. Moreover,
during the early 1980s, the dictator was a general who was an adherent of
a right-wing fundamentalist group based in the United States. In addition,
his chief advisors were from small California towns. These advisors
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actually had more adherents in Guatemala than they had in the United
States. This eventually was one of the factors that led to his being
deposed by other officers. The population had grown tired of being
directed by people from the United States.
But I think that one of the effects on military structures in Guatemala,
and, consequently, on human rights, was that there was a movement of
military officers into this fundamentalist sect. I interviewed an officer in
Guatemala and asked him why he was a member of the sect; he knew
nothing about it, but said, "because my boss is." This answer went all the
way up the line.
It is possible that this trend towards Protestant fundamentalism will
continue in other parts of Latin America. That certainly has been a worry
for the Catholic church. Nevertheless, the implications it has for human
rights depends entirely on the particular country. In some places, the
Protestant church has supported human rights, and then in other places the
church's largely fundamentalist sects have been very hostile towards these
rights. In this respect, I think it mirrors the conflicts within the Roman
Catholic church as well.
TEITEL: If there are no more questions, I think we can adjourn.
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